Reason for indirect discrimination need not be proven

Law and Labour — Sun, 09 Apr 2017 09:52:59 +0000

In two important judgments on the scope of indirect discrimination relating to race, age and religion – Essop and Naeem – the Supreme Court has decided that there is no need for claimants to prove the reason why a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) puts them at a particular disadvantage. The Court held that it was sufficient to show that there was a causal link between the PCP and the disadvantage suffered.

The Essop case

The Essop case concerned age and race discrimination involving staff at the Home Office who were required to pass a Core Skills Assessment (CSA) in order to gain promotion to higher grades in the civil service. Investigation into CSA pass rates had revealed that candidates who were aged 35 and over or who were non-White had lower pass rates than White or young candidates. However, the reason for this disparity was not known.

The disadvantaged candidates brought an employment tribunal claim arguing that the CSA amounted to indirect discrimination on grounds of age and race. The PCP they relied upon as causing the indirect discrimination was the requirement to pass the CSA as a pre-requisite to promotion. The case passed through the tribunals and lower courts before eventually arriving at the Supreme Court.

The key question for the Supreme Court to decide was whether in order to succeed in their indirect discrimination claim the disadvantaged candidates needed to establish the reason why the group had lower pass rates than their comparators. The Supreme Court decided that it was only necessary to show that the requirement to pass the CSA had caused the candidates to suffer from disadvantage, namely that the group failed the CSA disproportionately. It was not necessary to establish the reason for this particular disadvantage.

The Naeem case

Mr Naeem was a prison chaplain who brought claims of race and religious discrimination in respect of the Prison Service pay scheme for chaplains. The scheme provided that the pay of chaplains increased over time so that pay was linked to length of service. However, the average pay of Muslim chaplains was less than that of Christian chaplains because Muslim chaplains had only been employed in the Prison Service since 2002.

Mr Naeem argued that the pay scheme was indirectly discriminatory against Muslim and Asian chaplains due to their having shorter lengths of service on average than Christian chaplains. The Supreme Court considered two issues:

whether the reason for the disadvantage suffered by Mr Naeem had to be related to his religion or race; and whether the matter concerned all prison chaplains or only those employed since 2002.

The Supreme Court disagreed that there had to be any relation between Mr Naeem’s race or religion and the reason why the PCP in the case – the Prison Service pay scheme – put him at a disadvantage. The Supreme Court also decided that all the workers affected by the PCP should be taken into account, not just those employed after 2002.

The PCP identified was the incremental pay structure which affected all the chaplains employed by the Prison Service. [...]

Religion and work – a balancing act

Law and Labour — Sun, 20 Jan 2013 16:07:34 +0000

The European Court of Human Rights has decided that employees can display their religious beliefs at work, such as through the wearing of a cross, provided their actions do not interfere with the rights of others or jeopardise health and safety.

The Court gave its decision on four joined claims brought by British Christians. The claimants complained that UK legislation had provided insufficient protection for their religious rights after they suffered religious discrimination at work.

Both Nadia Eweida and Shirley Chaplin had been disciplined by their employers for wearing a cross while at work. Lillian Ladele was a registrar at a local council who had been disciplined by her employer for refusing to officiate at same-sex civil partnership ceremonies. Gary McFarlane had been disciplined for refusing to provide psycho-sexual counselling to same-sex couples.

The four applicants all claimed their employers had infringed their right to freedom of religion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Only Ms Eweida was successful in her case. The Court decided that her rights had been infringed because a fair balance had not been struck between her desire to show her religious belief through the wearing of a cross and the employer’s wish to project its corporate image.

But Ms Chaplin, Ms Ladele and Mr McFarlane were unsuccessful in their claims.

Ms Chaplin was a nurse who had breached the Department of Health’s policy that forbade the wearing of necklaces for safety reasons. The Court decided that hospital managers were better placed to make decisions on safety than a court, therefore the employer’s intervention had been necessary.

For both Ms Ladele and Mr McFarlane, the Court recognised that a balance had to be struck between accommodating their religious beliefs and their employers’ legitimate aim of promoting equal opportunities. The Court decided that the disciplinary action that had been taken against them was justified in pursuit of the employers’ objectives.

CASE Eweida and others v The United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 15 January 2013

Law and Labour » Religious discrimination

Reason for indirect discrimination need not be proven

Religion and work – a balancing act