The Trust pay Ms Brazel on a monthly basis according to the number of hours worked in the previous month, but she is paid her holiday pay at the end of every term. When calculating Ms Brazel’s holiday pay, the Trust followed Acas guidance on casual workers which, at the time, recommended using the rate of 12.07% per hour worked (the “Percentage Method”). Ms Brazel argued that was not the correct calculation under the Working Time Regulations 1998 (“WTR”). She disagreed that her holiday pay should be pro-rated simply because she did not work a full year.

Ms Brazel’s claim for unlawful deduction of wages failed in the Employment Tribunal, but her appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was successful. The Trust appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal. The Trust then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The question for the Supreme Court to decide was, by which method should Ms Brazel’s payments for annual leave be calculated? This raised an important issue about the statutory leave requirement for “part-year workers” – permanent workers who work for varying hours during only certain weeks of the year.

The Trust put forward various methods for calculating holiday pay, including the Percentage Method and the “Worked Year Method”. The latter method takes account of the fact that Ms Brazel does not work during school holidays. It uses the number of weeks she actually works (34 weeks) to calculate a percentage of the full working year (46.4 weeks). That percentage is then applied to the annual leave entitlement applicable to the full working year.

The Supreme Court found that these alternative methods were problematic. Firstly, they were very different from the statutory method set out in the WTR. Secondly, the calculations were very complicated. The Court noted that the statutory scheme could produce odd results but that does not justify wholesale revision of the scheme.

Importantly, the Supreme Court decided that the “Calendar Week Method” represents the correct implementation of the WTR and is fully compliant with EU law. Ms Brazel is entitled to 5.6 weeks’ paid leave which is taken in 3 equal tranches during the winter, spring and summer school holidays. This means that 1.87 weeks of each school holiday was treated as annual leave for which Ms Brazel was entitled to be paid. Under the Calendar Week Method, Ms Brazel’s holiday pay is calculated by first determining a week’s pay – her average weekly remuneration during the previous 12 weeks – and that figure is then multiplied by 1.87 to get the holiday pay she is due for the 1.87 weeks’ leave she took during each school holiday.

The Supreme Court held that even if the [...]]]> http://lawandlabour.com/part-year-workers-holiday-need-not-be-pro-rated-to-full-time-workers/feed/ 0 http://lawandlabour.com/gender-critical-views-were-part-of-protected-belief/ http://lawandlabour.com/gender-critical-views-were-part-of-protected-belief/#comments Sun, 13 Jun 2021 11:22:47 +0000 http://lawandlabour.com/?p=2714 Maya Forstater was a researcher hired by CGD Europe Limited (CGD) in November 2016 to carry out consultancy work and appointed a visiting fellow. She regularly posted social media comments on the “transgender debate” – the rights of transgender persons in wider society. In autumn 2018, staff at CGD raised concerns about Ms Forstater’s posts, which they felt expressed transphobic views. CGD investigated the complaints and decided not to offer Ms Forstater further consultancy work. Her visiting fellowship was not renewed.

Ms Forstater subsequently lodged a claim at the Employment Tribunal alleging direct discrimination and harassment on grounds of belief.

A preliminary hearing was necessary to decide whether Ms Forstater’s views were capable of protection under the Equality Act 2010 as a philosophical belief.

The first step was to define Ms Forstater’s views. The Tribunal summed up these as a “gender-critical belief” that “sex is biological and immutable”.

Next, the five-part test from the case of Grainger plc v Nicholson was applied to determine whether Ms Forstater’s belief was capable of protection under the Equality Act. The Grainger test requires the belief to be:

The Tribunal found that all of the “Grainger criteria” applied except for the fifth criterion (“Grainger V”), therefore Ms Forstater’s views did not amount to a protected belief. Ms Forstater appealed this decision.

The EAT disagreed with the Tribunal’s decision. It held that Grainger V should only exclude “the most extreme beliefs akin to Nazism or totalitarianism or which incite hatred or violence”. The EAT acknowledged that only a very few beliefs would hit that threshold. Of Ms Forstater’s views, the EAT said:

It is a belief that might in some circumstances cause offence to trans persons, but the potential for offence cannot be a reason to exclude a belief from protection altogether. Employment Appeal Tribunal

Anticipating that its judgment could be open to misinterpretation, the EAT took the unusual step of making its position on transgender issues clear. It stressed that its findings did not mean it was expressing any views on the merits of either side of the transgender debate. It said the judgment was not licence for persons to “misgender” trans persons (use non-preferred pronouns or gender) with impunity. The EAT pointed out that the Equality Act continues to prohibit harassment on grounds of gender reassignment.

In this ruling, the EAT has set a high threshold for the operation of Grainger V. It deems only the most abhorrent views or those capable of inciting others to be unworthy of protection. Some will feel that the threshold has been set far too high.

It remains to be seen whether CGD will appeal the decision to a higher court. [...]]]> http://lawandlabour.com/gender-critical-views-were-part-of-protected-belief/feed/ 0 http://lawandlabour.com/gender-reassignment-includes-non-binary-and-gender-fluid-persons/ http://lawandlabour.com/gender-reassignment-includes-non-binary-and-gender-fluid-persons/#comments Sun, 06 Dec 2020 20:01:13 +0000 http://lawandlabour.com/?p=2704 It’s not often that the Employment Tribunal is the site of a landmark decision, but that is the case with Taylor v Jaguar Land Rover.

The case concerned an employee of Jaguar Land Rover (JLR), Rose Taylor, who joined the company in 1999. Ms Taylor was considered to be a high performer and very competent at her engineering job.

By 2017, Ms Taylor had notified JLR that she was gender-fluid and transitioning, but she had no intention of undergoing surgery to reassign her gender. She retained her male birth name but chose to dress in a male style on some days and a female style on other days.

Ms Taylor was subjected to a sustained campaign of harassment on grounds of gender reassignment over a long period. Although she submitted a grievance to JLR about her treatment, the company did not take any action to prevent the discriminatory treatment from occurring or continuing. Ms Taylor’s employment by JLR ended in June 2018 shortly after she had contacted Acas to start early conciliation.

Following the ending of Ms Taylor’s employment, she brought claims of constructive unfair dismissal and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender reassignment, and victimisation.

The key question for the Tribunal to decide was whether a non-binary, gender-fluid person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. The definition of gender reassignment in the Equality Act describes a person who is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) to reassign their sex by changing “the physiological or other attributes of sex”.

The Employment Tribunal decided that a person need not have (or intend to have) surgery in order to identify as a different gender to their birth sex. Starting to dress or behave like someone who is changing their gender or is living in the identity of the opposite sex would be sufficient to qualify for protection from gender reassignment discrimination.

We thought it was very clear that Parliament intended gender reassignment to be a spectrum moving away from birth sex, and that a person could be at any point on that spectrum. That would be so, whether they described themselves as “non-binary” i.e. not at point A or point Z, “gender fluid” i.e. at different places between point A and point Z at different times, or “transitioning” i.e. moving from point A, but not necessarily ending at point Z, where A and Z are biological sex. Employment Tribunal

The Employment Tribunal considered it appropriate to award aggravated damages in this case because of the “egregious way” in which Ms Taylor was treated and the “insensitive stance” taken by JLR during the legal proceedings. This was in addition to a 20% uplift on damages due to JLR’s “complete failure” to comply with the Acas Code of Practice when handling the grievance. The parties eventually agreed compensation of £180,000.

The Employment Tribunal was scathing of JLR’s treatment of Ms Taylor which it found to be “unconscionable”. It took pains to stress that the fault did not rest with individual managers, [...]]]> http://lawandlabour.com/gender-reassignment-includes-non-binary-and-gender-fluid-persons/feed/ 0 http://lawandlabour.com/holiday-pay-for-part-year-workers-need-not-be-pro-rated/ http://lawandlabour.com/holiday-pay-for-part-year-workers-need-not-be-pro-rated/#comments Sat, 10 Aug 2019 16:01:11 +0000 http://lawandlabour.com/?p=2669 Ms Brazel works as a music teacher for the Harpur Trust. She is employed under a permanent contract and only works during term time. Her hours of work depend on the number of pupils requiring tuition. Ms Brazel is contractually entitled to 5.6 weeks’ holiday, but the contract did not expressly state that her holiday entitlement should be pro-rated.

The Trust pay Ms Brazel on a monthly basis according to the number of hours worked in the previous month, but she is paid her holiday pay at the end of every term. When calculating Ms Brazel’s holiday pay, the Trust followed Acas guidance on casual workers by using the rate of 12.07% per hour worked. Ms Brazel argued that was not the correct calculation under the Working Time Regulations and produced a lower figure. She disagreed that her holiday pay should be pro-rated simply because she did not work a full year.

Ms Brazel’s claim for unlawful deduction of wages failed in the Employment Tribunal, but her appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was successful. The Trust appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The question for the Court of Appeal to decide was, by which method should Ms Brazel’s payments for annual leave be calculated?

The Court of Appeal coined a new term to describe employees in Ms Brazel’s situation – “part-year workers”. The Court felt that it was not apt to call such employees “term-time workers” as that denoted employees who are only employed during the term, while Ms Brazel was employed all the year round, albeit she only worked during term time.

Importantly, the Court decided that the position of a part-year worker such as Ms Brazel was not the same as a part-time worker, so there was no need to apply pro-rating as one would with the latter type of worker. This meant Ms Brazel’s holiday pay should be calculated by first determining a week’s pay – her average weekly remuneration during the previous 12 weeks – and then multiplying that figure by 5.6. This would make Ms Brazel’s holiday pay 17.5% of her actual earnings as opposed to the 12.07% rate used by the Trust.

The result is that a part-year worker will get higher holiday pay than a full-year worker, but the Court did not consider this to be “unprincipled or obviously unfair”:

“the actual days from which they will be relieved, and the quantum of their holiday pay, will reflect their actual working pattern.” Court of Appeal

This case will have implications for employers of part-year workers, such as teaching institutions, as these workers may complain about the size of their holiday pay or bring claims for unlawful deductions. There is some comfort for employers that such claims have a retrospective limit of two years.

Any employers who currently use the 12.07% rate to calculate holiday pay for permanent part-year workers would do well to review their employment contracts and assess their potential litigation exposure. The benefit of moving to calculate holiday pay on the basis [...]]]> http://lawandlabour.com/holiday-pay-for-part-year-workers-need-not-be-pro-rated/feed/ 0 http://lawandlabour.com/claimants-right-to-privacy-insufficent-to-prevent-online-publication-of-judgment/ http://lawandlabour.com/claimants-right-to-privacy-insufficent-to-prevent-online-publication-of-judgment/#comments Sun, 10 Feb 2019 17:29:17 +0000 http://lawandlabour.com/?p=2654 Since February 2017, it has been possible to obtain copies of Employment Tribunal judgments from an online database managed by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. When online judgments were first introduced, they were welcomed as a move towards open justice by adding transparency to the Tribunal process. One risk of any litigation, in addition to the concomitant time and cost, is the potential for reputational damage. Employers which fear having a public spotlight drawn to their activities are often keen to settle. However, the risk of damage to reputation applies to employees as well. The individual who has taken steps to assert their hard-earned employment rights might be labelled a troublemaker by potential employers.

This was the difficulty faced by the claimant in the case of Ameyaw v PricewaterhouseCoopers Services Ltd. Miss Ameyaw was employed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) as a senior manager. She brought four claims against PwC which ultimately failed when they got to a final hearing. The early stages of the proceedings included a January 2017 preliminary hearing that was closed to the public and a hearing concerning an application to strike out the claim, which was heard in March 2017.

The judgment for the March 2017 hearing was published online and contained unflattering depictions of Miss Ameyaw’s conduct at the January 2017 preliminary hearing. Miss Ameyaw applied to the Tribunal for an order to (1) ensure the judgment relating to the final hearing would not be published, (2) remove the March 2017 judgment from the online register, and/or (3) anonymise her name in both judgments.

The application was made, Miss Ameyaw said, because she felt online publication of the judgments was harming her ability to find new employment. The Employment Tribunal rejected Miss Ameyaw’s application, so she lodged an appeal at the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT).

The first question for the EAT to consider was whether the Tribunal had the power to exclude a judgment from the online register. The EAT found that it did not. The only exception permitted to the Tribunal was to exclude written reasons from a judgment if national security might be affected.

The second question was whether, if a judgment had to be published, should the Tribunal have exercised discretion and anonymised Miss Ameyaw in order to protect her right to a private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

In deciding this point, the EAT first had to consider whether Article 8 was triggered by the circumstances of the case. The EAT found it was not: Miss Ameyaw could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of a public hearing.

The EAT decided to go further and consider whether, had Article 8 been engaged, Miss Ameyaw’s right to privacy would have outweighed the common law principle of open justice and the competing ECHR rights to a fair trial (Article 6) and to freedom of expression (Article 10). The EAT found the Tribunal had decided correctly that there was no basis for overruling the principle of open justice in Miss Ameyaw’s case. [...]]]> http://lawandlabour.com/claimants-right-to-privacy-insufficent-to-prevent-online-publication-of-judgment/feed/ 0